Philosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy

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This journal is a yearly philosophical journal published by the Dept. of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy, welcomes contributions from all fields of philosophy. The editorial policy of the journal is to promote the study of philosophy, Eastern and Western in all its branches: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Logic, Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Science, Mind, Religion and Language. However, it would like its contributors to focus on what they consider to be significantly new and important. The contributions should, as far as possible, avoid jargon and the authour’s contention should be stated in as simple a language as possible.

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    A critical exposition on quine’s notion of meaning and indeterminacy
    (University of North Bengal, 2024-03) Adhikari, Niranjan
    This paper contained a critical discussion of Quine’s theory of meaning in terms of his indeterminacy thesis. In analytic philosophy, especially in semantics, language is used as a tool to interpret the knowledge of the world. A language consists of propositions. Every proposition in our language must be meaningful. So, meaning is the fundamental component of a proposition. Now the problem is: how do we determine the meaning of a proposition? Quine exemplified that every way to determine the meaning of a linguistic expression by traditional semantics is totally wrong about meaning. Instead of following the traditional semantics, Quine relies on a behaviouristic approach towards meaning. He qualified traditional semantics as a “myth of museum” that exhibits meaning in a certain kind of entity. This article consists of four different sections. In the very first section of this paper, I intended to explain the argument of Quine against traditional semantics on meaning as an entity. The second section deals with a critical evaluation of Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning and conceptual scheme. In the third section, I attempted to explain Quine’s critical observation on meaning in terms of the indeterminacy thesis. This final section holds concluding remarks, in which I object to some misconceptions regarding Quine’s theory of meaning.