Understanding Cognition and Accounting for Error in Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā Philosophy

Abstract

Different philosophical systems accept various means of attaining cognition according to their systemic frameworks. Accordingly, the notions of validity and invalidity of cognitions, and the means of determining them vary in the individual philosophical systems. In the present paper, we concentrate our study only on Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā philosophy, regarding the above. The Prābhākara system considers knowledge to be selfexpressive and self-evident. That is, knowledge manifests itself on its production, and cognition as such is intrinsically valid. Such an epistemological claim requires philosophical investigation. Further, the question arises that, since knowledge as such is intrinsically authentic, then from such an epistemological position, how error is accounted for, as encountered in our everyday life. The paper in concern aims at delving into the said issues with a critical approach.