Wittgenstein’s Counter-explanatory take on Religion

Abstract

If we try to understand any philosophy of religion in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings we may not find one, still his remarks on religious beliefs and languages draw some interesting points that could tempt us to look at religions and religious practices with an open ended perspective. Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough is an example of his approach against explanation of religious beliefs and rituals. Wittgenstein thinks that the explanation of killing the priest-king in order to keep his soul as fresh does not add any significant value to the religious discourses. Any kind of metaphysical thematization in this regard is better to get rid of, as far as Wittgenstein’s views are concerned. Rather he takes an anthropological approach to religion and its practices, where the practices are intertwined with his notions of language-games and forms of life. D.Z. Phillips addresses the fact that in Wittgenstein’s earlier writings on Frazer we find that there could be a principle in the language by which all the rituals could be ordered, but later on as Rush Rhees points out, it has been found that the imagination of ritual implies it imagining in a form of life. Our urge for explanation often takes us to a juggernaut from where it becomes so much difficult to return and have peace. I will be trying to show how clarity in the Wittgensteinian sense could help us better to comprehend the value of religion and have impact over our religious discourse. Rituals in religion can’t be based on evidences, like what is done in science. Religion is based on faith. If there is loss of faith in God, then it need not be based on rational justification rather a shift in the form of life where the older language might seem meaningless to the concerned person.