Harman’s Moral Relativism: A Critical Reflection
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Article
Date
2025
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Publisher
University of North Bengal
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Abstract
The main contention of this paper is to show, how Gilbert Harman expresses his thoughts
about the idea of moral relativism and also to explore the plausible responses that challenge
his notion that moral judgments are relative and dependent on individual or cultural
perspectives. Harman was a strong and influential defender of moral relativism and he was
a leading voice in supporting and promoting this view, as well as his work had a substantial
impact on the field of ethics and morality. Harman’s relativism is characterized by its
logical consistency, and as such, it requires careful consideration. Individuals hold diverse
moral perspectives and principles. This diversity of moral opinions has led many to
question whether there are any objective moral standards that apply to everyone. Many
people disagree on moral issues, even within their own culture, especially across different
cultures. Some people think this disagreement means there is no one “right” answer, and
no universal moral truth that applies to everyone. Instead, they believe that moral beliefs
are personal and vary from culture to culture, like a matter of taste. This paper intends to
defend Harman’s perspective on moral relativism and also to highlight the complexities
and challenges inherent in this viewpoint.
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Accession No
0976-4496
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Volume Number
XXI
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Pages
Pages
127 - 139