Harman’s Moral Relativism: A Critical Reflection
dc.contributor.author | Rajak, Nibita | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-05-20T06:35:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2025 | |
dc.description.abstract | The main contention of this paper is to show, how Gilbert Harman expresses his thoughts about the idea of moral relativism and also to explore the plausible responses that challenge his notion that moral judgments are relative and dependent on individual or cultural perspectives. Harman was a strong and influential defender of moral relativism and he was a leading voice in supporting and promoting this view, as well as his work had a substantial impact on the field of ethics and morality. Harman’s relativism is characterized by its logical consistency, and as such, it requires careful consideration. Individuals hold diverse moral perspectives and principles. This diversity of moral opinions has led many to question whether there are any objective moral standards that apply to everyone. Many people disagree on moral issues, even within their own culture, especially across different cultures. Some people think this disagreement means there is no one “right” answer, and no universal moral truth that applies to everyone. Instead, they believe that moral beliefs are personal and vary from culture to culture, like a matter of taste. This paper intends to defend Harman’s perspective on moral relativism and also to highlight the complexities and challenges inherent in this viewpoint. | |
dc.identifier.accn | 0976-4496 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/5533 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | University of North Bengal | |
dc.subject | Moral Relativism | |
dc.subject | Diversity | |
dc.subject | Morality | |
dc.subject | Moral Objectivity | |
dc.subject | Culture | |
dc.subject | Moral Absolutism | |
dc.subject | Moral Theory | |
dc.subject | Moral Framework. | |
dc.title | Harman’s Moral Relativism: A Critical Reflection | |
dc.title.alternative | Philosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy, Vol. XXI, March- 2025, pp. 127-139 | |
dc.type | Article | |
periodical.pageEnd | 139 | |
periodical.pageStart | 127 | |
periodical.volumeNumber | XXI |